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THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS OF NEWSPAPER
CARRIERS: SOME ANTITRUST QUESTIONS*
INTRODUCTION
Typically, home delivery of newspapers is carried on through a
system of exclusive routes.' Under this system newspapers are sold
by the publishers to the carriers2 who then resell the papers to the
public. Each carrier services a designated area or route.' The carrier's
compensation is measured by the difference between the price paid by
the customer and the price charged by the publisher plus whatever
tips the carrier may receive.
The legal relationship between the publisher and the carrier is
curious, to say the least. The crucial question is whether the carrier is
a "servant" or an "independent contractor."' This may seem merely an
academic question. However, the determination of the carrier's status
is of utmost importance to newspaper publishers. The publishers are
the first to insist that their carriers are independent contractors and
not servants. 5
A determination of this question is important for two reasons.
First, if the carriers are not servants, the publisher is not liable for
their torts under the laws of agency and the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Second, if the carriers are independent contractors, the
publishers escape many of the burdens and requirements of modern
social legislation.'
* This paper was originally prepared in fulfillment of seminar requirements at
the Valparaiso University School of Law. The author, David Hessler, is presently
a third-year law student.
1. In a recent case, when a witness was asked how long this method of delivery
had been used, he answered "forever." Albrecht v. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 367
F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1965).
2. This paper will use the term "carrier." Designations such as "newspaperboy,"
"newsboy," or "paperboy" are synonymous.
3. Most newspapers are distributed by both minor and adult carriers. Minors
usually distribute the city routes while adults usually service the outer areas. These
outer areas typically demand the use of some mode of transportation and are commonly
referred to as "motor routes."
4. Perhaps the term "employee" would be more descriptive in light of modern
usage, but the Restatement of Agency uses the term "servant" to connote those
who work for others. Therefore, when referring to common law the term "servant"
will be employed in this paper, while the term "employee" will be used when speaking
of modern social legislation. In this way the terms used will 'be consistent with the
references in each of the areas. The terms are practically synonymous.
5. See, e.g., Appendix III.
6. E.g., the National Labor Relations Act, Workmen's Compensation Acts, the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Social Security Acts.
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This paper discusses certain situations in which the carrier's status
as an independent contractor has been urged. The discussion illustrates
the general acceptance accorded the publisher's contention that the
carriers are independent contractors. The final sections of the paper
discuss the antitrust implications of the carrier-publisher relationship.
It would be ironic if this carefully nurtured relationship would result
in adverse antitrust implications for the publishers. This unexpected
twist, it is suggested, may be the result of recent Supreme Court antitrust
activity.
COMMON LAW
Under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, the deter-
mination of whether a carrier is a servant or an independent contractor
is no simple task. However, the courts are in general agreement as
to the indicia of the status of an independent contractor. The ultimate
test in determining whether a carrier is an independent contractor or
a servant is the amount of control reserved by the employer.7 Courts
are also in agreement that the presence, in any given case, of one or
more of the recognized indicia of the status of independent contractor
is not necessarily conclusive. There is no absolute rule for determining
whether a carrier is a servant or an independent contractor, but each
case must be determined on its own facts. Attention is often focused
on the intention of the parties as evidenced by written contracts or
agreements. However, the mere fact that the agreemnt refers to the
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs
of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance
of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation
or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupations;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
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carrier as an independent contractor or as an agent is not controlling.
Consequently, cases within this area produce conflicting results.
A number of cases have held that the circumstances established
that the status was not that of servant as a matter of law." In Batt v.
San Diego Sun Publishing Co.,9 the carrier struck a minor with his
automobile while collecting from subscribers on his route. The court
looked to the contract between the carrier and the publisher and decided
that since the carrier was collecting from regular subscribers, a duty
imposed upon him by the contract, the latter determined his status as
of that time. Other cases considered factual contexts in which the
determination of the carrier's status was a jury question.' ° In Joslin v.
Idaho Times Publishing Co.," a newspaper company was sued by a pedes-
trian for injuries sustained when struck by a motorcycle being operated by
a carrier. There was no written contract between the carrier and the
publisher, but there was an oral agreement that the carrier was to
furnish his own means, methods, and manner of conveyance without
restrictions or supervision as to the kind, character, or use thereof. The
agreement also provided that, subject to the requirement of delivery at
the specified places within the required time, the carrier was free to
cover the route in any order, within such time and at such speed as
he desired. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to show
that the relationship between the company and the carrier was that of
master and servant.
By taking note of the circumstances relied on by the courts in
imposing liability, publishers were able to draft contracts and control
their carriers (or not control their carriers, as the case may be) in such
a manner so as to escape much of the common law civil liability under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. 2 As a result, civil liability of
publishers for torts of carriers is not very common today.'"
8. Batt v. San Diego Sun Publishing Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 429, 69 P.2d
216 (1937) ; Rathburn v. Payne, 21 Cal. App. 2d 49, 68 P.2d 291 (1937) ; Bohanon v.
James McClatchy Publishing Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 188, 60 P.2d 510 (1936); Florida
Publishing Co. v. Lourcey, 141 Fla. 767, 193 So. 847 (1940) ; Morris v. Constitution
Publishing Co., 84 Ga. App. 816, 67 S.E.2d 407 (1951) ; Skidmore v. Haggard, 341
Mo. 837, 110 S.W.2d 726 (1937).
9. Batt v. San Diego Sun Publishing Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 429, 69 P.2d 216 (1937).
10. Hampton v. Macon News Printing Co., 64 Ga. App. 150, 12 S.E.2d 425
(1940) and Joslin v. Idaho Times Publishing Co., 56 Idaho 242, 53 P.2d 323 (1935).
11. Joslin v. Idaho Times Publishing Co., 56 Idaho 242, 53 P.2d 323 (1935).
12. See the carrier contracts reprinted in Appendix I and II.
13. Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 MIcH. L. REv. 365 (1930);
Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 501 (1934);
Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 188 (1939).
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SOCIAL LEGISLATION
Frequently, a determination of the carrier's status has been re-
quired under modern social legislation. However, even in this context,
the determination has been imprecise. Conflicting results rather than
uniform handling are much in evidence. An examination of several
social legislation acts illustrates the situation.
A. National Labor Relations Act.
The carrier-publisher relationship under the National Labor
Relations Act1" provides an excellent example of how newspaper
publishers have successfully asserted the independent contractor status
of carriers. One of the landmark cases in this area under the Act is
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1944." The principal question was whether
newsboys were "employees" under the Act. Since Congress did not
explicitly define the term "employee,"" 6 the publisher contended that
its meaning must be determined by reference to common law standards.
The Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Rutledge, rejected
this argument, stating that the argument assumes that there is some
simple, uniform and easily applicable test to determine whether persons
doing work for others fall into one class or the other. The Court felt
that this apparent simplicity is illusory because it involves a simplicity
of formulation rather than of application. The Court stated that "the
assumed simplicity and uniformity . . . of common law standards, does
not exist." '
On the other hand, the NLRB argued that the carrier is an
employee. In support of this contention, the Board alleged that the
carrier is one of a group which the NLRA is designed to protect."5
The determination of the status depends on the intent of Congress in
drafting the Act. This argument has force, especially if uniform applica-
14. 49 Stat. 449, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964). Also known as the
Wagner Act.
15. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
16. The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as
a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because
of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family
or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parents or spouse.
49 Stat. 449 (2), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1964).
17. 322 U.S. at 122.
18. The carriers were organized as a unit under the "Truck Drivers and
Helpers Local Union No. 696," affiliated with the "International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America."
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tion of the Act is the desired result. If the determination of the status
were left to the common law rules, variations in the statute's operation
would be as numerous as the differences between the fifty states.
"Employees" in one state would be "independent contractors" in another.
The scope of the statute's protection would depend upon the accidental
location of the work and the attitude of the particular local jurisdiction
rather than on whether the worker's situation falls factually within
the ambit Congress had visualized. Of the desirability of this situation
the Court said:
Both the terms and the purpose of the statute, as well as their
legislative history, show that Congress had in mind no such
patchwork plan for securing freedom of employee's organiza-
tion and of collective bargaining.'"
In ascertaining the intent of Congress the Court looked to the
purpose of the Act, which is to avert the "substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce" which result from "strikes and other
forms of industrial strife or unrest" by eliminating the causes of that
unrest.2" Since the evil at which the Act is directed and the remedies
it offers are not confined exclusively to "employees" within the traditional
legal distinctions separating them from "independent contractors," such
distinctions become irrelevant for purposes of the application of the
Act. Some forms of services will be within the Act while others will
be beyond its coverage. The Court concluded that newsboys were within
the Act because they are subject, as a matter of economic fact, "to the
evils the statute was designed to eradicate."'" Thus, under the National
Labor Relations Act, the Court adopted a test of economic reality rather
than control or the right to control as at common law.
One year after the Hearst decision, in the case of Pulitzer Publish-
ing Company v. Paper Carriers Local 450,2 the National Labor
Relations Board again determined that carriers were employees within
the coverage of the Act. Therefore, publishers were required to conduct
collective bargaining with the carriers. However, when the last
of the Pulitzer Publishing Company agreements with the carriers ex-
pired, the publisher announced that it would no longer enter into
collective bargaining agreements with carriers, maintaining that the
carriers were independent contractors. On review of their prior decision,
the Board determined that in the period since the 1945 decision, sub-
19. 322 U.S. at 123.
20. Id. at 126.
21. Id. at 127.
22. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Paper Carriers Local 450, 62 NLRB 229 (1945).
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stantial changes in the relationship between the carriers and the publisher
had occurred. These changes tended to establish the status of the
carriers as independent contractors within the meaning of the Act.2 3
In reaching this determination the Board resorted to the old "right
to control" test. 4 The test was set forth as follows:
[W]here the person for whom the services are performed re-
tains the right to control the manner and means by which the
result is to be accomplished, the relationship is one of employ-
ment; while, on the other hand, where control is reserved only
as to the result sought the relationship is that of an independent
contractor."
This 1964 decision seems to be the prevailing view under the Act.
Thus, where the publisher's only retention of control is in the initial
establishment of the relationship with the carrier, in the determination
of the contents of the delivered newspaper, and in the frequency of its
delivery, leaving the method of delivery to the carrier, the carrier will
be an independent contractor within the contemplation of the NLRA.
The practical result of this is that publishers are able to free themselves
from the collective bargaining and other requirements of the Act in
the same manner as they were able to escape civil liability for the torts
of their carriers.26
B. Workmen's Compensation Acts
Most workmen's compensation acts do not apply the economic
reality test. Rather, they recognize that compensation acts do not have
the broad social basis that other social legislation, such as the National
Labor Relations Act, has.2 - Thus, the control test and the common
law distinctions between servants and independent contractors are usually
employed. The result is that carriers under workmen's compensation
23. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Paper Carriers Local 450, 146 NLRB 302 (1964).
24. This was not the first case which adopted the right to control test. It was
previously restated in Lindsay Newspapers, Inc., 130 NLRB 680 (1960). The test
has been used many times. See, e.g., A.S. Abell Co., 137 NLRB 238 (1962) and The Kan-
sas City Star Co., 76 NLRB 284 (1948).
25. 146 NLRB at 305.
26. Note that the carrier contracts (Appendix I and II) leave unmentioned any
provisions concerning method of delivery.
27. Elder v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 230 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950), rev'd, 149 Tex. 620, 236 S.W.2d 611 (1951). The court reviewed the Hemrst
decision and said that "This decision makes it clear that the meaning of the term
'employee' as used in the National Labor Relations Act is not the same as its
meaning in the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. at 1021.
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acts are employees in some cases,"8 independent contractors in others,2"
included in some jurisdictions ° and excluded in others.2 " However,
the rule of the majority appears to be in accord with the view that a
newspaper delivery boy is an independent contractor and not an employee
of the publishing company within the workmen's compensation act.82
The factors generally treated as controlling are that the agreement for
the sale of the newspapers purports to be one of principals and that
delivery methods on each route are largely left to the carrier's discretion.
Once again, the result is that newspaper publishers are able to escape
the burdens of administering the workmen's compensation laws, in a
majority of the cases, by asserting that carriers are independent con-
tractors and by drafting appropriate contracts and exercising only
proper control.2 8
C. Other Social Legislation
Results are similar under other social legislation. For example, both
child and adult carriers are exempt from the requirements of the Social
Security Act. 4 The same is true under the Fair Labor Standards
28. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 208 Cal. 715, 284
P. 661 (1930); Macon News Printing Co. v. Hampton, 192 Ga. 623, 15 S.E.2d
793 (1941); DeMonaco v. Renton, 32 N.J. Super. 450, 108 A.2d 506 (1954); Samuel
Gorden v. Newark Star-Ledger, 131 N.J.L. 373, 36 A.2d 616 (1944) ; Bergerson v.
Press Co., 252 App. Div. 716, 298 N.Y.S. 685 (1937) ; Hann v. Times Printing Co.,
166 Va. 102, 184 S.E. 183 (1930); Wilson v. Times Printing Co., 158 Wash. 95,
290 P. 891 (1930).
29. Great American Indemnity Co. v. Fleniken, 134 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1943);
New York Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 213 Cal. 43, 1
P.2d 12 (1931); Bohanon v. McClatchy Publishing Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 188, 60 P.2d
510 (1936); Call Publishing Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 89 Cal. App.
194, 264 P. 300 (1928); Ross v. Post Publishing Co., 129 Conn. 564, 29 A.2d 768
(1943); Carter Publications v. Davis, 24 Kan. 363, 68 S.W.2d 640 (1934) ; Gall v.
Detroit Journal Co., 191 Mich. 405, 158 N.W. 36 (1916); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v.
Greenlee, 150 Okla. 69, 300 P. 684 (1931) ; Balinski v. Press Publishing Co., 118 Pa.
89, 179 A. 897 (1935).
30. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.07 (1955) states that the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Statute extend to "every person selling or distributing newspapers or
magazines on the street or house to house."
31. CAL. CODE ANN. § 3352 (1953). The workmen's compensation statute
excludes "any person engaged in vending, selling, offering for sale, or delivering
directly to the public any newspaper, magazine, or periodical where the title has
passed to the person so engaged."
32. See, e.g., Hann v. Times-Dispatch Publishing Co., 166 Va. 102, 184 S.E. 183
(1938) and Wilson v. Times Printing Co., 158 Wash. 95, 290 P. 691 (1930).
33. A list of indicia used in determining the degree of control was published by
the ANPA in one of its Bulletins. This list is reproduced in Appendix III.
34. 49 Stat. 620, 42 U.S.C. § 410 provides:
(a) The term "employment" means any service performed.. .; except
that ... such term shall not include-
(14) (A) Service performed by an individual under the age of eighteen in
the delivery or distribution of newspapers or shipping news, not including
delivery or distribution to any point for subsequent delivery or distribution.
(B) Service performed by an individual in, and at the time of, the sale of
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Act. 5 This Act would not apply to those carriers deemed "independent
contractors." However, even if the carriers are "employees," they are
exempted. Section 13(D) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides
an exemption from the child labor and the wage and hours provisions
for employees engaged in the delivery of newspapers to the consumer.
This provision applies to carriers engaged in making deliveries to the
homes of subscribers or other consumers of newspapers. It also includes
employees engaged in the street sale or delivery of newspapers to the
consumer. However, as in the Social Security Act, employees engaged in
hauling newspapers to drop stations, distributing centers, newsstands,
etc., do not come within the exemption because they do not deliver to the
consumer.
From this summary, it is evident that newspaper publishers have
been successful in limiting their liability for the torts of carriers and
exempting themselves from the administration of modern social legisla-
tion. The vehicle has been the independent contractor status of carriers.
Let us now examine the impact of this carefully nurtured status when
viewed in relation to the antitrust laws.86
POSSIBLE ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
It is important to note the purpose of the antitrust laws. In 1955,
the "Report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study
The Antitrust Laws" stated:
The general objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of
competition in open markets. This policy is a primary feature
of private enterprise. Most Americans have long recognized
that opportunity for market access and fostering of market ri-
valry are basic tenets of our faith in competition as a form of
economic organization."
It should be noted that, to date, no decision has ever found an
antitrust violation in the dealings of a newspaper publisher with his
newspapers or magazines to ultimate consumers, under an arrangement under
which the newspapers or magazines are to be sold by him at fixed price, his
compensation being based on the retention of the excess of such price over the
amount at which the newspapers or magazines are charged to him, whether or
not he is guaranteed a minimum amount of compensation for such service, or is
entitled to be credited with the unsold newspapers or magazines turned back.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1964).
36. The basic antitrust statutes include: (1) The Sherman Act: 26 Stat. 209,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1964); (2) The Clayton Act: 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27(1964) ; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964) ; (3) The Federal Trade Commission Act: 38 Stat. 717,
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1964); (4) The Robinson-Patman Act: 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. §§
13, 13a, 13b, 2 1a (1964) ; (5) The Miller-Tydings Act: 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1964) ; (6) The McGuire Act: 66 Stat. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
37. AGNC Report 1 (1955).
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carriers. However, neither have newspaper publishers and carriers been
excluded from the requirements of the antitrust acts.8" We must there-
fore operate under the premise that the antitrust laws are applicable to
publishers and carriers whose newspapers are deemed to be part of
interstate commerce.39
A. Resale Price Maintenance
The validity of an attempted maintenance by the manufacturer of
resale prices of his product was tested in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park
& Sons."' The medical company marketed its product through various
independent retailers and distributors. Although the medicine was sold
to the distributors, the medical company attempted, by contract, to
specify the resale price.4' The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Hughes, held that this attempted price maintenance was illegal.
Apparently concentrating on the fact that the goods were sold to the
distributors, the Court said:
And where commodities have passed into the channels of trade
and are owned by dealers, the validity of agreements to prevent
competition and to maintain prices is not to be determined by
the circumstances whether they were produced by several manu-
facturers or by one, or whether they were previously owned by
one or by many. The complainant having sold its product at
prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever
advantage may be derived from competition in the subsequent
traffic.2
Thus, the contracts were illegal and invalid both at common law
and under the Sherman Act. The doctrine expounded in this case has
become known as the doctrine of "per se" illegality of resale price
maintenance contracts. The reasonableness of the price maintenance
scheme is of no consequence.
38. For a discussion of antitrust exemptions see F. ELKOURI, TRADE REGULATION
(1957).
39. See Lorain journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). The Las Vegas
Sun had a daily circulation of about 8,000 papers which were distributed in 31 states;
it received United Press news service and other nationally distributed columns and
features; ink and other supplies were received from out of state. The Court held the
paper to be engaged in interstate commerce.
40. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
41. These contracts were drafted as agency contracts. They were designated
"consignment contracts" and "retail agency contracts." However, the court looked beyond
the terminology of the contracts and declared that the so-called "retail agents" were not
agents at all, but are contemplated purchasers who buy to sell again; that is, retail
dealers. The contracts were essentially attempts by the manufacturer to fix the amount
which the consumer shall pay.
42. 220 U.S. at 409.
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The relationship between the newspaper publisher and the carrier
is quite similar to that in the Miles case. The carrier buys his papers
from the publisher and then resells them to the subscribers on his route.
Thus, as in the Miles case, the distributor or retailer is the owner of
the article. Also, the contract between the publisher and the carriers
provides that the carrier will sell the newspapers "at the established
rate therefor."4 This seems to be an example of the per se violation
spoken of in the Miles case. It should be noted that the carrier contracts
are designated as those of an agent.4 Also, the route or list of sub-
scriptions is called a "lease."" However, as we have seen,"' the
courts will look beyond the printed word of contracts and determine
what the relationship is in fact. Thus, the mere heading of a contract
purporting to be of "agency" and "leasing" is of little consequence.
B. Refusals to Deal
Refusals to deal are closely aligned with resale price maintenance.
Inasmuch as resale price maintenance is declared to be a per se violation
of the antitrust laws, the question arises as to what a manufacturer may
do, if anything, to protect himself and his product from those who
cut prices. Actually, the manufacturer does have some power, although
the exact extent of this power is unclear. It is clear, however, that the
producer or manufacturer has the right to refuse to deal with a retailer
who will not maintain the prices suggested or recommended by the
producer. In the case of United States v. Colgate & Co., 7 Mr. Justice
McReynolds, for the Court, declared that in the absence of any intent
to create a monopoly," the Sherman Act does not prevent a manu-
facturer from announcing in advance the prices at which his goods may
be resold and that such a manufacturer may refuse to deal with whole-
salers or retailers who do not conform to the advertised prices.49
Thus, a manufacturer may not make a contract to maintain or
fix the resale prices of goods he sells, but the manufacturer may refuse
to sell to a retailer who does not maintain suggested retail prices.
Interestingly enough, there does not seem to be any middle ground. A
43. Both of the carrier contracts (Appendix I and II) contain the following
clause: "(1) That I will sell and regularly deliver the [newspaper] to all of said
subscribers, at the established rate therefor."
44. See Appendix I and II.
45. Id.
46. See notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text.
47. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
48. If done with the intent of creating a monopoly, refusals to sell are unlawful.
United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
49. This was established as law before the Colgate case. See Brown, The Right
to Refuse to Sell, 25 YALE L.J. 194 (1916).
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manufacturer may give warning of a refusal to sell unless retail prices
are maintained,5" but almost every other form of affirmative action
taken by a producer to keep up the resale price of his product is invalid.
The administration of a refusal to deal policy was considered in
FTC v. Beecth-Nut Packing Co. 1 The Beech-Nut company had an
elaborate system of checking on its retailers and weeding out those who
cut prices. Retailers with a record of cutting prices on Beech-Nut products
were denied the right to purchase such products. In 1922 the company
was advised that its efforts constituted unfair competition. The Court
pointed out that the company's practices went beyond a mere refusal
to sell.
[The] system here disclosed necessarily constitutes a scheme
which restrains the natural flow of commerce and the freedom
of competition in the channels of interstate trade. 2
The Court found that it could "infer, indeed cannot escape the con-
clusion, that competition among retail distributors is practically sup-
pressed."5
In subsequent cases it was determined that producers could not
require the assurance of the retailers that resale prices would be main-
tined,5 nor could producers solicit information from customers as to
their compliance, or the compliance of other customers with the resale
price restrictions.5 5
However, there remains one form of resale price maintenance
approved by the Court. In United States v. General Electric Co.,56
it was held that if a true agency relationship existed, the principal
could fix the prices at which the agent might sell at retail.
The impact of all of this on the newspaper publishers is that
publishers and carriers may not contract to resell the paper at an
established rate, but the publisher may refuse to sell to those carriers
who do not sell at the published price. Thus, by redrafting the contract,
newspaper publishers are able to circumvent the restrictions against
resale price maintenance.57 Indeed, this is what the publishers are
50. United States v. Hudnut, 8 F.2d 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
51. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
52. Id. at 454.
53. Id. at 455.
54. Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1926).
55. Cream of Wheat Co. v. FTC, 14 F.2d 40 (1926).
56. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
57. Rather than having a clause in the contract whereby the carrier is required
to sell at an established rate, publishers could fail to mention the resale price in the
contract; most carriers would automatically sell at the published resale price. A clause
permitting the publisher to refuse to deal with carriers who refuse to sell at the
suggested price would most likely be inserted.
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encouraged to do.5
However, as shown above, the practice and administration of a
refusal to deal operation may in itself constitute an antitrust violation.
Anything beyond a warning of refusal to sell unless resale prices are
maintained could constitute sufficient affirmative action to be a violation.
An interesting analysis of resale price maintenance, refusals to
deal, and newspapers is offered in the case of Albrecht v. The Herald
Company.59 This was a treble damage action by a newspaper carrier
against the newspaper. The "Globe-Democrat" was a morning news-
paper delivered to home customers of the St. Louis area through a
system of 172 routes. The carriers were entrepreneurs, purchasing
their papers at wholesale and selling them at retail. The plaintiff operated
route number 99 which consisted of approximately 1200 customers.
The Globe-Democrat advertised a suggested retail price in its
newspaper. Carriers were subject to termination for charging more
than the suggested retail price. This was accomplished by an insertion
in the contract which read:
The right of each carrier whose appointment is effective to sell
the St. Louis Globe-Democrat by home delivery in his territory,
will be maintained exclusively to him under the terms of his ap-
pointment so long as the price at which such sales are made in
his territory shall not be higher than the price therefor suggested
by the publisher for such sales in the City or County in which
such territory is located.6"
The plaintiff adhered to the suggested retail price for several
years, but started overcharging in 1961. Customers on his route then
began calling the Globe-Democrat to complain about the overcharging.
Plaintiff was informed about these calls during the years 1961 and
1962. Finally, in May of 1964, the Globe-Democrat informed the plaintiff
that it would start to compete in the area through another carrier at
the lower, established prices. Letters were then sent to the customers on
route 99 explaining the position of the newspaper and telling the cus-
tomers that if they were being overcharged they could purchase their
papers from the new carrier at the established rate. Following the
letters, house to house solicitations were made in behalf of the Globe-
Democrat. This campaign resulted in a customer list of 314 by July
7, 1964. This new route was taken over by one George Kroner with
the understanding that he might be required to return it to the plaintiff.
58. See point four under Appendix III.
59. 367 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1966).
60. Id. at 519.
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During this period the Globe-Democrat continued to sell papers to the
plaintiff who continued to sell them to his customers. The newspaper
again warned the plaintiff that by the terms of the contract the paper
was not required to continue to do business with him. On August 21,
1964, the Globe-Democrat notified the plaintiff of his termination as a
Globe-Democrat carrier. This termination came after the plaintiff filed
the present suit. The plaintiff thereafter sold his route for $12,000.00.
This was more than he had paid for it, but less than he would have
received if the Globe-Democrat had returned the 300 customers com-
prising the alternate route.
The theory of plaintiff's action was that Section 1 of the Sherman
Act was violated by reason of a combination between the Globe-
Democrat and Kroner. Plaintiff argued that the case was controlled
by the per se cases and was therefore a question of law and not of
fact. The court rejected this argument and distinguished the per se
cases:
[T]he record evidence reveals many obvious distinctions from
any of the reported cases relied upon by plaintiff ["per se"
cases].
As examples, none of the cited cases involves a business whose
product must be delivered daily at a certain time by a monopo-
listic delivery man; and in none does the sales price of the
product to the consumer represent only a fraction of the cost of
the product. In none is the only alternative a monopoly leaving
unprotected the public interest."
Furthermore, the court claimed that the activity in this case was
unilateral and thus no combination could have been formed. The practical
result of the competition, as declared by the court, was that "Globe-
Democrat's activity here did not hinder, but fostered and actually created
competition to the benefit of the public." 2
This case is, no doubt, a great victory for the newspaper publishing
industry. It stands for the proposition that publishers may refuse to
deal with those carriers who do not sell at the suggested price. However,
the case does not hold that publishers may contract with carriers to
maintain a retail price. Thus, even in light of this case, those publishers
who draft contracts similar to those in Appendix I and II would still
appear to be in violation of the antitrust laws. It is also interesting to
note that Kroner, the carrier who took over the alternate route, was
deemed an employee of the Globe-Democrat. In this way the Globe-
61. Id. at 524.
62. Id. at 522.
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Democrat's action was unilateral and not a "combination." But, what
if the situation would arise where the agreement between the publisher
and the carrier were not unilateral? If Kroner were not an employee of
the publisher but an independent contractor like other carriers, would
it then be said that there was no violation? This question was not
posed and consequently not answered.
However, let us make a close examination of the court's reasoning.
As previously stated, the basis for the decision was that the product
had to be delivered at a certain time by a "monopolistic" delivery man
and the only alternative was a monopoly leaving unprotected the public
interest. Stated in other words, the court's reasoning would run some-
thing like this: if a carrier, who had the exclusive right to deliver in a
certain area, could exact any price for the paper he wanted, both the
public and the publisher could be injured. The public would be injured
in that they would have to pay a higher price than other areas if they
wanted the same paper. The publisher would be injured because people
would stop buying the paper if the price were too high. Therefore, the
reasoning continues, the publisher should be able to protect both himself
and the public by being permitted to refuse to deal with carriers who do
not sell at the retail price suggested by the publisher. This reasoning
is bolstered by the only available alternative, that being the establishment
of a monopoly leaving unprotected the public interest. This monopoly
would be according to the court, comprised of publishers who employ
their carriers and could thereby:
[W]reck such havoc as Mr. Justice Douglas decried in his
opinion in Standard Oil Co. of California and Standard Sta-
tions v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318-319, 69 S. Ct. 1051,
1066, 93 L. Ed. 1371 (1949) : 'But beyond all that there is the
effect on the community when independents are swallowed up
by the trusts and entrepreneurs become employees of absentee
owners. Then there is a serious loss in citizenship. Local
leadership is diluted. He who was a leader in the village be-
comes dependent on outsiders for his action and policy. Clerks
responsible to a superior in a distant place take the place of
resident proprietors beholden to no one.'6
Further analysis reveals discrepancies in the court's reasoning. It
is difficult to determine just what action is condoned and what action is
condemned. However, one may surmise that the court believes that
publishers are justified in refusing to deal with carriers who do not
63. Id.
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maintain the established retail price. Further, when a carrier does over-
charge, the newspaper publisher may send an employee into the area
to compete with the carrier. It is this result that is difficult to rationalize
with the philosophy of the court in upholding refusals to deal.
First, refusals to deal are valid because when a carrier has an
exclusive area to serve, he could conceivably charge whatever price he
wants and both the public and the publisher will be harmed.
Second, the only alternative open to the publisher, argues the
court, would be a monopoly leaving the public interest unprotected.
As stated above, this monopoly would consist of publishers employing
carriers. Since the carriers would then be employees, the publisher
could charge whatever price he wanted and "wreck havoc." However,
this argument assumes too much. It assumes that when all of the
carriers are employees and action on the part of the publisher is uni-
lateral, the public will be put into the helpless condition of being forced to
bow to whatever price is demanded by the publisher for the paper. This
is simply not true. Each newspaper is in competition with other news-
papers and news media. If the price of the paper is too high the public
can refuse to buy. The publisher has no real monopoly over the product
or the price. At any rate, how can the situation be any different than it
is now merely because the carriers are employees rather than independent
contractors. If the publisher does not have a monopoly now, it is
surely not because his carriers are independent contractors rather than
employees. The status of the carriers, under present price fixing
practices, has nothing to do with the established price of the newspaper.
It appears that the publishers are establishing the prices irrespective
of the status of the carriers. If there is no monopoly now, and the
court recognizes this, how could there be a monopoly merely because
carriers are employees? Or, if there would be a monopoly when carriers
are employees, why is it that there is not a monopoly now? In the
final analysis, the status of the carrier is simply irrelevant to the question
of monopoly.
Third, as noted above, the court condones the sending of an employee
into the area in dispute. The court relies on this factor for the deter-
mination that there is no combination or agreement in restraint of
trade. There simply can be no "combination" when the action is uni-
lateral. It is this aspect that is most confusing. It is confusing because
the court is relying on the same thing to justify its decision of non-
combination that it condemns as an alternative to the refusals to deal
In both instances the publisher is using carriers in the capacity of an
employee. In speaking to the question of "combination," the court said
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that there can be no combination between the publisher and the carrier
because the carrier is an employee. In the words of the court: "Globe-
Democrat acted only through its employees and agents. Thus it became
a carrier itself in competition with plaintiff."6
However, when speaking to the validity of refusals to deal, the
court stated that they are valid because the alternative would be a
monopoly, i.e., making all carriers employees. Wherein lies the rationale?
Sending carriers in to compete is condoned because the carriers are
employees. Refusing to deal with carriers is condoned because the
alternative is making them employees and this is bad. Perhaps this
criticism of the court's reasoning would seem more substantial if fifty
carriers or one hundred carriers were involved in overcharging. Accord-
ing to the decision in this case the publisher could send in carriers as
employees. What if all of the carriers overcharged? Then the publisher
could send employees into all of the areas. Would this then be any
different than the result or alternative condemned by the court in
justifying refusals to deal? This writer sees no difference.
The court continues by saying that "To have condoned plaintiff's
overcharging would have been a signal to all carriers, each monopolistic
in his own right, to mulct the public for all the traffic would bear." 5
Perhaps the evil lies in the exclusive route system. This is the subject
of the following section.
C. Exclusive Territorial Distributorships
An exclusive territorial distributorship is an attempt to divide a
given marketing area into a number of smaller territories. Typically, one
distributor is given exclusive control of distribution within each territory.
Apparently, the route system of newspaper distribution is merely a
variation of the exclusive distributorship.
Horizontal Territorial Restrictions
Functionally, the antitrust implications of an exclusive territory
agreement revolve around the particular agreement's status as a horizontal
or a vertical restraint. Horizontal restraints are per se violations of
the Sherman Act.66
A horizontal restraint is an exclusive territory agreement initiated
by the distributors of a product, with or without the cooperation of the
64. Id. at 523.
65. Id. at 522.
66. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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manufacturer."7 The case of United States v. Sealy, Inc.,6" illustrates
the nature of a horizontal restraint. The Sealy corporation licensed
manufacturers of mattress and bedding products to make and distribute
these items under the Sealy trademark. Each licensee was required to
limit its sales to a defined area. All of the licensees were stockholders
of Sealy.
In defense of the government's attack on this territorial arrange-
ment, Sealy contended that the arrangement was vertical in nature and
should be judged on the basis of a rule of reason.6" Sealy relied upon the
formal corporate entity, claiming that the licensor initiated the restraint
and not the licensees." The Supreme Court rejected this argument and
held that the licensing arrangement was, in fact, an invalid horizontal
restraint.7 The Court looked beyond the formal corporate entity; it
found a mere paper corporation whose actual control rested in the
joint venturor licensees.
Sealy was a joint venture, of, by and for its stockholder-
licensees; and the stockholder-licensees are theirselves directly,
without even the semblance of insulation, in charge of Sealy's
operations."
Vertical Territorial Restraints
A vertical restraint is an exclusive territorial arrangement initiated
by the manufacturer. Generally, a vertical restraint is valid unless it is
unreasonable.7" This reasonableness is determined
by considering whether the restraint is such only as to afford a
fair protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom
it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests
of the public.74
This "rule of reason" treatment of vertical restraints was modified
in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co."' Distribution of Schwinn
products was accomplished primarily through three methods. These
67. See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
68. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 87 S. Ct. 1847 (1967).
69. Id. at 1850.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1851.
72. Id. at 1850.
73. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The applicability
of this rule of reason has been questioned. E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 45
(1964).
74. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 709 (1944).
75. 87 S. Ct. 1856 (1967).
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were: 1) direct sale to Schwinn distributors; 2) sale to franchised
retailers through agency or consignment arrangements with the dis-
tributors; and 3) direct sale to franchised retailers. In connection with
each of these methods, Schwinn imposed restrictions upon the resale of
its product. The distributors were required to sell only to franchised
retailers and only within a specified territory. The retailers were subject
to territorial restrictions and were prohibited from selling to non-
franchised retailers.
According to the majority of the Supreme Court, the district court
held that, "where a manufacturer sells products to its distributor subject
to territorial restrictions on resale, a per se violation of the Sherman
Act results."7 This determination was not tested on appeal. Instead,
the government contended that the lower court's decree of invalidity
should be extended to. all territorial restrictions, regardless of the nature
of the agreement by which the distributor acquired possession of the
product. The government also urged that the agreements limiting the
distributor's resale to franchised retailers should be enjoined. Finally,
the government asked the Court to prohibit the restrictions on the
retailer's right to resell to a non-franchised retailer.
In ruling upon the government's contentions, the Court adopted
a dichotomous treatment of vertical restraints. Apparently, the per se
validity of the restraint is conditioned upon whether the distributor
has purchased the product. The Court extended the lower court's per
se invalidity rule to all resale restrictions in the situations in which
the Schwinn product was sold to the retailer or distributor.
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has
parted with dominion over the product, and his effort there-
after to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may
be transferred . . . is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.
77
The Court, however, rejected the opportunity to extend the per
se rule to, situations in which the distributor did not purchase the
product. The government contended that limiting the invalidity decree
to sale transactions provided only a partial remedy. Allocation of territory
and restriction to franchised retailers can only be eliminated, the govern-
ment urged, by enlarging the decree to forbid these practices however
effected. The Court disagreed.
We conclude that the proper application of § 1 of the Sherman
76. Id. at 1859.
77. Id. at 1867.
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Act to this problem requires differentiation between the situa-
tion where the manufacturer parts with title, dominion, or risk
with respect to the article, and where he completely retains
ownership and risk of loss."8
While an extended critique of the Schwzinn decision is beyond
the scope of this paper, certain aspects of the Court's decision must be
noted. The Court prefaces its remarks on the validity of the restraints
by noting that the government did not contend for a per se rule. This, the
Court states, requires an analysis of the market impact of the restraints.
The Court's analysis, however, consists of no more than a cursory
comment on a limited aspect of the market situation. This comment is
followed by an abrupt reversal of emphasis and the adoption of the per se
rule without a clear statement of the necessity for this new rule.
The reasons advanced by the Court for the adoption of the per se
rule should also be noted. The Court assigns two factors in support of the
rule. These are: 1) the restrictions violate the rule against restraints
on alienation, and 2) the rule is an extension of the district court's
decree, necessary to avoid inconsistency. Clearly, the ancient rule against
alienation restraints is a doubtful basis for a modern antitrust decision.
The impact of the district court decree is also questionable. As noted
by the dissent, the district court decision may have been based on a
finding of a horizontal restraint."9 As such, it would not compel a
similar per se rule in the context of a pure vertical restraint. The
weakness of the Court's reasons is especially noteworthy in the context
of recent Court decisions refusing to apply a per se rule to restraints of
a much harsher nature than the Schwind restrictions."0
Finally, if the Court, in fact, intends to prohibit all franchise
agreements involving sold goods, it is eliminating a traditional and
effective mode of business. Franchising arrangements provide an avenue
for small businesses to compete with larger enterprises. Indeed, the
Court recognizes the value of this traditional function when it affirms the
use of a rule of reason in connection with consignment or agency
agreements.
Perhaps, in the final analysis, the Court is merely imposing an
additional cost on doing business by franchise. Generally, little difficulty
would be encountered in making the transition to an agency or consign-
ment other than increased cost. One wonders, however, why this addi-
tional cost must be assessed. One also wonders whether the Court will
78. Id. at 1865.
79. Id. at 1871.
80. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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retreat from this per se rule when confronted by a manufacturer who
is unable to make the transition.
Restraints in the Context of the Newspaper Carrier
The route system of newspaper delivery clearly involves vertical
rather than horizontal restraints. The restrictions are initiated by the
publisher and there is no evdience that the carriers are able to alter the
restrictions. Accordingly, the sytsem appears to be within the pro-
scriptions of the Schwinn case.
Before the standards of the Schwinn case are applied in the news-
paper delivery context, a factual distinction should be noted. The invalid
Schzwinn restrictions clearly affected distributors and retailers with re-
spect to their resale to other retailers. However, the invalid restrictions
did not as clearly affect the sale of the product to the public. On the
other hand, the newspaper restrictions directly control the "retailer's"
sale to the public. This distinction may be of value in view of the
Court's prior tendency to allow justification for territorial restrictions
on the retailer while disallowing attempted justification of restrictions on
wholesale distributors."' It should be remembered, however, that the
Court in Schwinn did not mention this distinction.
As indicated in Appendix I and II, the typical route delivery
system involves a sale of the newspapers to the carrier. Applying the
Schwinn per se standard, the route restrictions attendant to this sale
appear to be invalid. This apparent invalidity may, however, be of little
consequence to the publishers. The consignment device would appear to
be a readily available alternative to the sale contract.
CONCLUSION
The premise of the entire antitrust discussion was the fact that
newspaper publishers have successfully contended that carriers are in-
dependent contractors. When a manufacturer chooses to deal with in-
dependent contractors certain results follow. All of these results have
been favorable to the newspaper publishers. The publishers have been
able to escape the responsibilities of civil tort liability and also the
requirements of modern social legislation. If publishers want their
carriers -to be independent contractors, let them be independent con-
tractors. However, if they are independent contractors, the carriers
should also have all the rights and privileges of independent contractors.
At the expense of an old cliche, it seems that newspaper publishers have
been having their cake and eating it too. They have enjoyed all the
advantages of agency with none of the responsibilities.
81. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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If, as the publishers assert, the carriers are independent contractors,
it would appear that the present distribution system may be violative of
the antitrust laws. Clearly, any contractual limitation of resale price
is a violation. Also, in view of the Schweinn decision, the validity of the
territorial restrictions embodied in the route system is doubtful.
APPENDIX I
TIlE VIIET--E-MIISSIENCtEV
Route No.
AGENT'S OR CARRIER'S LEASH
Date ........................ - 19
The undersigned acknowledges receipt from THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER, of Valparaiso, Indiana, of a list of sub-
sribers who purchase THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER and who live on a certain paper route in.
which list of subscribers and paper route is hereby leased to me by THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER and in consideration
thereof I hereby agree to and with THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER as follows:
(I). That I will sell and regularly and promptly deliver THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER to all of oiid subscribers, at
the established rate therefor.
(2) That I will -not sell or deliver any other newspaper to any person without the written consent of THE
VIDETTE-MESSENGER.
(8) That I will do all in my power to promote and extend the circulation of THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER.
(4) That prior to giving up said paper route I will give THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER two weeks notice of my in-
tention so to do.
(5) That I will not turn over said list of subscribers to any person nor disclose the name of any subscriber for
THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER without first obtaining the consent of THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER.
(6) That I have not paid any money to any person for this list of subscribers and that I will not sell it to any per-
son or persons for any money. That I will not collect in advance from any of my subscribers. That should I do so I
shall become responsible for any such amount under my bend and deposit.
(7) That I will regularly and promptly pay, each ......................... for all copies of THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER
sent to me in accordance with my orders, at the.established wholesale rate.
(8) THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER may cancel this lease at any time for good and sufficient reason sad when o
cancelled I agie to forthwith turn over to THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER, or its authorized representative, the names of
all subscribers to whom I had been delivering THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER and I agree to keel, a written list of all
such persons with their street addresses and that such written list shall be the property of THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER.
(9) The Carrier Salesman shall deposit with THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER $.................... THE VIDETTE
MESSENGER shall add thereto interest at the rate of three per cent (1%) per annum. The deposit with said interest
shall be held by THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER for the purpose of securing to it the performance by the Carrier Sales-
man of all his agreements, and for the purpose of securing to it the payment of all claims hereafter accruing to THE
VIDETTE-MESSENGER against the Carrier Salesman. Two weeks after the termination of this contract (whether
by THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER or by the Carrier Salesman) THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER shall refund such
part of the deposit as shall remain after atisfying all claims accruing to THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER against the
Carrier Salesman since the date of this contract.
Carrier's Signature . .. .............
AGENT'S OR CARRIER'S REPORT
This must be filled in
Carriers Full N ame .......................................................................................................................................
Street Address ...............................................................................................................................
Town . ...................................................................................................................................... .
Occupation or Business or School Attended .................................................
Phone . ... . .".. .... ..----------.
Date Now Carrier is to Bein Delivery . ..................-......................................... ...... .
Date New Carrier Starts to Collect and from Which His First Payment is Due
It is mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the carrier, being a minor, his parent
... ....... . ... ....... hereby agrees to and with THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER to be responsible
for the performance of each and all of the obligations and agreements herein contained.
PARENT ........... .....
THE VIDETTE-MESSENGER
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APPENDIX II
Circulation Department THE POST-TRIBUNE Route No.
The Post-Tribune
1065 Broadway AGENT'S OR CARRIER'S LEASE District
Gary, Indiana 46402
Phone 885-7531 Date
The undersigned acknowledges receipt from THE POST-TRIBUNE, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the 'Company," of a
list of subscribers (collection book) who purchase THE POST-TRIBUNE and who live on a certain paper route in __
_ which list of subscribers and paper route is hereby leased to me by the Company and in con-
sideration thereof I hereby agree to and with the Company as follows:
(1) That I will sell and regulary and promptly deliver THE POST-TRIBUNE to all of said subscribers, at the established
rate therefor.
(2) That I will not sell or deliver any other newspaper to any person without the written consent of the Company.
(3) That I will not attach to THE POST-TRIBUNE any outside material of any kind without first securing the written consent
of the Company.
(4) That I will do all in my power to promote 'and extend the circulation of THE POST-TRIBUNE.
(5) That prior to giving up said paper route I will give the Company two weeks' notice of my intention to do so,
(6) That I will not turn over said list of subscribers to anypOrson nor disclose the name of any subscriber for THE POST,
TRIBUNE without first obtaining the consent of the Company.
(7) That I have not paid any money to any person for this list of subscribers and that I will not sell it to any person or persons
for any money.
(8) That I shall be liabl' for advance eollcctions beyond the cancellation date of this contract.
(9) That I will regularly and promptly pay, each designated Saturday before 5., for all copies of THE POST-
TRIBUNE sent to me in accordance with my orders, at the established wholesale rate.
(10) The Company may cancel this lease at any-time for good and sufficient reason and when so cancelled, I agree to forth-
with turn over to the Company, or the authorized representative of the Company, the names of all subscribers to whom
I have been delivering THE POST-TRIBUNE and agree to keep a list of all such persons with their street address and
that such list shall be the property of the Company and subject to its inspection at any time.
CARRIER:
Carrier's Full Name__Phone
Age Birthday
Street Address City Zip
School attending
Date new carrier is to begin delivery First Payment Due
Remarks:
DEPOSIT
I agree to make a deposit of $ to cover the rost of any papers which I have received and for which I have not
paid, or any amount for which I should beceme indebted to the Company.
I agree to pay this deposit at the rate of $ . , down and * S ,per period for
payments, or until the total deposit has been paid. Any balance remaining of said deposit, after all my bills are paid, shall be re-
turned to me within thirty days of such time as I shall have surrendered the route to the Company.
The above is in no way' a receipt for down payment on deposit.
CARRIER:
It is mutually understood by and between the parties hereto that, the carrier being a minor, his parent
hereby agrees to and with the Company to be responsible for the performance of each and all of the obligations and agree-
ments herein contained.
CARRIER:
Place of employment of Parent
Daily drop PARENT:
Daily rain drop COMPANY: THE POST-TRIBUNE
Sunday drop BY
W. C. Todd, Circulation Director
APPENDIX III
Excerpt from American Newspaper Publishers Association General
Bulletin
Factors used in determining the independent contractor status:
1. Publisher's fixing route limits.
2. Ownership of subscription list.
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3. Requiring prompt pick-up or delivery, and otherwise determining
hours.
4. Fixing wholesale and retail prices ("We suggest you control the
wholesale price only since in most cases the newspaperboy will
charge the publicly advertised retail price.")
5. Retaining power in newspaper only to terminate on little notice or
without notice.
6. Furnishing supplies or vehicles.
7. Restricting competition or non-competitive activities.
8. Giving instructions in detail of route operation.
9. Subscriber complaints.
10. Imposition of fine or penalty for missed deliveries.
11. Bearing of losses from operation of route; reimbursement of ex-
penses; extensions of credit to customers; unlucrative routes; special
allowances; returns.
12. Right of paper to approve transfer of route by newspaperboy.
13. Right of newspaperboy to obtain helpers and substitutes.
14. Contractual provision prohibiting insertion of advertisement or
other foreign matter.
15. Prepaid subscribers.
16. Requirement of sale and collection for reader insurance and mag-
azine subscriptions.
17. Requirement of bonds, deposit or guaranty.
18. Designating place of delivery and matter of travelling route.
19. Required attendance at meetings and other promotional activities.
20. Assistance in servicing route, making collections and getting sub-
stitutes.
21. Bonuses and prizes.
22. Requiring collections at stated intervals.
23. Specific language in contract indicating independent contractor
status.
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